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Background: In mainland China, the motivation behind voluntary blood donation is a relatively new and
understudied behavior. In recent times provincial governments in China have implemented various institutional
incentive measures. However, little is known regarding the effectiveness of such measures. This qualitative study
investigated the nature and outcomes of some identified institutionalized mechanisms, in particular how these
were created and distributed in the form of incentives for voluntary blood donation.
Methods: Participatory observations were conducted at two blood donation stations and four blood collecting
vehicles in Changsha city, China. In-depth interviews were conducted with 17 staff and 58 blood donors at the
aforementioned venues from May to October 2008 in Changsha.
Results: Thematic analysis revealed the operation of four primary type incentives: policy-driven, symbolic,
information feedback and role models, which constituted the system of institutional incentives. The current blood
reimbursement system was not the primary motivation for blood donation; instead this system was a subtheme of
future assurance for emergency blood needs. It was evident that symbolic incentives stressed the meaning and
value of blood donation. Furthermore, post-donation information services and the inherent mechanisms of
communication, enhanced by some public role models, served to draw the public to donate blood.
Conclusions: At the institutional level, blood donation was not only informed by altruism, but also carried a system of
benefit and reward for the donors and their family members. We would recommend that such arrangements,
if accommodated effectively into China’s health promotion strategies, would increase the likelihood of blood donation.
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In mainland China, voluntary blood donation is a rela-
tively new and understudied behavior. Blood has deep
cultural meanings in China as it is seen to be very pre-
cious. Losing blood is equivalent to losing one’s bodily
vigor or ‘Yuan QI’ [1]. Blood is also seen as a gift from
one’s parents and it is against filial piety [1,2] to give it
away. These traditional Chinese beliefs may discourage
voluntary blood donation. Hence, it is important to instill
various types of incentives to counteract such cultural
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orHistorically, contaminated commercial blood/plasma
donations have caused HIV outbreaks among many
villagers in some provinces in China [3-5]. The crisis
prompted the Chinese government to amend its blood
donation laws and policies in 1997 and to promote
voluntary blood donation actively. Currently, voluntary
blood donation has become the sole source of blood
supply for clinical use in most cities in China. New mea-
sures entitle blood donors and their family members to
a lower-cost or free life-time blood transfusion when
needed, proportionate to the volume of blood donated.
A recent literature review showed that recent studies
tend to use psychological theories or related factors to
explain and to promote blood donation [6]. Positive
factors motivating voluntary blood donation include al-
truism, incentives, as well as influences exerted by one’s
significant others and the press. Negative factors includeThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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throat and fever), permanent deferral and medical
reaction (e.g. physical reactions to blood donation) and
widespread disinterest [7]. It is contended that external
motivation drives people to donate blood for the first
time; internalized motivation (e.g. the virtue of donation
and the norm of helping others) is then formed, turning
blood donation into a habit [8].
In China, a survey conducted in three cities, in Hubei
Province, found that 75.5% of blood donors donated
blood gratuitously to ‘help others’ whereas 12.9% did so
in order to obtain free blood supply for themselves and
their families in the future; 6.3% did so for social recog-
nition and 2.8% for a free physical examination [9].
There is a dearth of qualitative studies on the topic in
literature, especially those conducted in Mainland China
[10-12]. Furthermore, there is an ongoing debate on
whether blood should be regarded as a gift or as a com-
modity [13-15]. In general, the principle of voluntary
blood donation campaigns in China is trying to avoid
compulsory mobilization and the commercial blood sup-
ply, but promote voluntary, gratuitous, citizenship as the
basis of blood donation [5].
Altruism is commonly cited as the primary motivation
of blood donation but the picture may have been over-
simplified. Titmuss contended that blood donors do not
require or expect a return, and no one expects himself/
herself (or his/her family) to accept free blood transfu-
sion in the future [13]. Voluntary blood donation has
hence been described as ‘perhaps the purest example’ of
altruistic behaviors [16]. However, blood donation can also
be beneficial to the donors and their family members.
Symbolic incentives are also important [17]. Therefore,
the reality requires a more comprehensive examination of
incentives behind blood donation in China. The impor-
tance of the structural and institutionalized means to
manage and to deliver such incentives has been
overlooked. Social structures and institutions within a
given society are supposed to inspire altruism. Merton
suggests that institutionalized altruistic behavior leads to
behaviors orientated to helping others through structured
mechanisms to distribute rewards and penalties. The social
structure would increase the frequency of individual altru-
istic behaviors, whether motives are altruistic or egotistic
in nature [18]. It has been further argued that the social
organization and the way of structuring social insti-
tutions, especially institutions concerning health and
welfare, can encourage or discourage people’s motives
for altruism [13].
China, as a country with a population of 1.37 billion
[19] is in urgent need to develop an effective voluntary
blood donation system to ensure a steady supply of
blood for clinical use. There have been reports of shor-
tage in the country and the number of donors need tobe increased sharply [12,20]. The country is therefore
actively formulating and updating its policy on blood
donation. There is however, a dearth of data looking at
the in-depth reasons and motivations behind blood
donation. Such information is warranted to improve the
current blood collection system. This study is therefore
a timely one to examine the role of blood donation insti-
tutions in shaping public altruism.
One caution has to be made when promoting voluntary
blood donation. In many countries or regions, previous
studies have shown that some high risk individuals use
blood donation as a means of testing stigmatized blood-
borne infectious diseases, such as HIV [13,21-23]. Despite
numerous measures such as counseling, advance blood
test technology, and even penalties to safeguard contami-
nation in blood donation, problems such as window
period for detection still exist [24]. Therefore, health
workers need to keep such considerations in mind when
promoting blood donation.Methods
This study was conducted from May to October 2008, in
Changsha, Hunan province, China. Changsha was chosen
as its blood donation system typifies current models of
metropolitan cities of China. In Changsha, the collection
of whole blood is the dominate objective while apheresis
platelets are collected to a significantly lesser extent. In
June 2005 the amount of compensated blood supply
decreased to zero; compulsory blood donation organized
by employers and donation centers [1,20] was also abo-
lished in 2007. Similar trends occurred in most major
cities of China.
In this study, participatory observations were conducted
at two blood donation stations and four blood collecting
vehicles. In-depth interviews were conducted with 17
blood centers’ staff, and 58 blood donors at the aforemen-
tioned venues. After briefing about the objectives of the
study, informed consent was obtained from all partici-
pants, who were assured of confidentiality, the use of
pseudonyms, and safe storage of the data. All of the inter-
views and participant observations were conducted by the
first author. Ethical approval was obtained from the
department of anthropology at Sun Yat-sen University
(NO.:FWA00007867).
The audio-recorded interview data were transcribed
verbatim to capture cultural concepts and nuances em-
bedded in the language, while another two members of
the research team, with qualitative and ethnographic
training, reviewed the transcripts to ensure accuracy. An
independent audit trial was kept for any discrepancies
from the verbal data to be compared with the notes of the
audit trial. All transcriptions were coded by coders who
first familiarized themselves with the raw information and
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sistency with the data.
Continuously, new codes were added and unfit codes
were discarded, keeping data grounded and developing
content sensitivity. In the final process of the analysis,
two investigators compared their code lists together to
resolve any discrepancies. Final main codes were deter-
mined according to the common themes agreed [25]. All
the above steps were undertaken by using software for
qualitative data processing and analysis (ATLAS.ti 5.2). Key
findings were then translated into English by an inde-
pendent bilingual translator who was not a member of the
research team. Upon conclusion of this process another
independent bilingual back-translated the new English
version into Chinese then compared his version with the
original Chinese version and compared the previous.
Results
The main themes found were policy-driven incentives,
symbolic incentives, information feedback and role models,
which constituted the system of institutional incentives.
Insured blood use as a policy-driven institutionalized
incentive
Blood recipients testified the need to pay for their blood
transfusions, and reported the cost could be waived
totally or partially for future blood needs for the donors
and their family members. This incentive is an insurance
in nature because not every blood donor, nor his/her
family members, would necessarily draw on this op-
portunity over their lifetime. Testimony to contingent
incentives is provided in the following.
L, a male Grade 3 university student, who donated blood
for the first time on New Year’s Day of 2006, spoke about
the donation policy, as well as his family’s attitudes.
When I donated blood then, I didn’t dare to tell my
parents. For this reason, I learned more about the
benefits of blood donation, because telling more
benefits to my parents might make them feel better.
I first told them that after the blood donation, anyone
of the family could use blood for free just in case. They
thought over and approved of my donation since this
had no harm to my health…They donated blood later,
too. As you know, few people would donate blood in
my small county town.’ (20080521—Student L)
In this case, the blood reimbursement policy appeared
to have served as an important incentive. In student L’s
testimony, the incentive becomes a type of ‘insurance’
for blood users, especially for those from underprivileged
families.
Another testimony was provided by Uncle B who lived
in the countryside of XX City, Hunan Province. A doctorin Changsha told him that his daughter needed a blood
transfusion. However, Uncle B was unable to afford this.
The doctor told him to donate blood in order to use
blood for free. As follows:
Q: ‘Uncle, how old are you?’A: ‘57 years. I was born in 1951.’Q: ‘You’re ineligible for blood donation because of your
age. The prevailing blood donation age is from 18 to
55 years. Do you have any other relatives in your
family?’A: ‘My wife is as old as me. My daughter is 26 and
eligible for donation, but she cannot do this. Oho.
(After a while of silence) I had to persuade the doctor
to let me donate blood.’The uncle negotiated with the nurse but failed. He got
off the blood collection vehicle and told me, ‘This
policy is good, but why should there be an age limit?’
(20080625—Uncle B)
Secretary Y of Changsha Blood Center was interviewed
at the blood center, claiming:
‘In 2006, a patient who had donated 900 cc of blood
(which means that he can use an unlimited amount of
blood throughout his life) needed to be transfused with
a large amount of blood. The cost was about RMB
20,000 (US$3200). When our director sent the money
to him at his bed (as a reimbursement), his family was
highly moved.’ (20080605—Secretary Y)
Some donors interviewed however did not know about
this policy, nor believed that they would need a blood
transfusion. Mr. W worked in a factory which was near
a blood donation center and said:
‘I did not know about this in the past, but a nurse just
told me, just as what the poster says.’ ‘Hum, this policy
is fairly good.’Q: ‘Will you donate blood next time?’A: ‘Of course, as long as I have time.’Q: ‘Are you motivated by this blood use policy?’After thinking for a while, he answered, ‘Maybe a
little, but I do not come here for this. Look at me,
how healthy I am! How can I use blood now?…’
(20080628—Mr. W)
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than the insured blood incentive, they did not object to
the policy. They stated, ‘It is better to have this policy
in place’, thus being socially illustrative of the opera-
tionalization of an institutionalized blood donation
mechanism.
Symbolic meaning as an institutionalized incentive
Intangible symbolic incentives to donate blood included
respect, care, meaning and the association with positive
values. Such incentives fulfilled people’s social and men-
tal health needs, as opposed to their materialistic or
utilitarian needs, and in some cases may well inform
their intention to donate blood. We contend here that
such incentives are further institutionalized by such
potent reinforcements as special souvenirs. In Changsha,
blood donors received special souvenirs such as key
holders, lovers’ watches, and T-shirts. The blood dona-
tion card was also reported by some informants to con-
stitute a valuable souvenir. All these souvenirs bore the
slogan ‘blood donation is beneficial to health and blood
saves lives’, and the label of ‘Changsha Blood Center’.
These souvenirs acted as symbolic interpretations of the
potency of voluntary blood donation. In Changsha other
examples of the gift provision were Olympic Fuwa dolls
made specifically for the Beijing Olympic Game which
represented the Olympic spirit. Some special editions
were stenciled with an Olympic special memorial for
gratuitous blood donation and were given to blood
donors as a significant souvenir.
X, was Grade 3 university student, and had donated
blood for the first time when she was a first year
student and had subsequently donated blood four more
times. We observed her attending to the donation
center with a pile of blood donation cards to claim
the Fuwa dolls. When she was asked about reasons
for possessing so many blood donation cards, she
said:
‘Sometimes when I saw a blood collecting vehicle on
the street and I was due for blood donation, I then
donated blood. Although I did not take any former
blood donation card with me, I thought that it was
good to have one more (smiling). I plan to get more
cards before graduation.’ She told me that she would
present this set of the Fuwa dolls to her boyfriend,
because her boyfriend was ineligible for blood
donation (highly myopic); he accompanied her during
each blood donation. She said, ‘This is our shared gift.’
When I asked her if she valued these small gifts, she
said: ‘It is of course good to have them, just for
memory. In fact, every donor does not care about any
reward, and a small souvenir would be okay, such as a
blood donation card.’ (20080612—Student X)At noon time on June 10, three male and two female
students arrived at the donation vehicle in their school
uniforms and were each given a blood donation card.
One of the boys then said:
‘We don’t need so many blood donation cards. Can
you just give us one card that bears all our names?’ I
told him that one blood donation card was for one
person only and his request was impossible. He added,
‘Why don’t you put our barcodes (used for blood donor
identification) on one card?’ Feeling surprised, I asked
him why. A girl answered, ‘We just need a memorial of
our friendship, because we come here together.’ ‘Can’t
one card per person also be taken as a memorial?’ I
gave them this advice. However, that boy said, ‘This
cannot represent our friendship.’ Seeing that they
insisted, I did not want to frustrate them and told
their request to the nurse. Finally, these students did
not succeed. (20080610—several senior high school
students).
Such a testimony suggests that in China, blood is
highly symbolic and carries special cultural associations,
such as a bond of loyalty and friendship. In China in
historic times, people were sworn into ceremonies for
joining specific associations by shedding blood into a
bowl of wine and sharing it to symbolize fraternity [26].
Inherent in these illustrations are the Chinese notions of
‘gloriousness’ and symbolic meanings of owning a blood
donation card. Merton suggests that, this (institutional-
ized incentive) helps increase the number of individuals
choosing altruistic actions and goes far beyond any other
possible action (such as actions based completely on
human nature, early-stage socialization or any other
disposition) [18]. In our ethnography, we observed that
monetary and utilitarian compensation had been re-
placed by such institutionalized symbolic incentives,
which was a significant transformation.
Information about health status and positive self-
appraisal as institutionalized incentives to donate
According to our observation, information about the
donor’s health status has been used as an institutiona-
lized incentive to promote voluntary blood donation. To
ensure blood safety, the donated blood specimens are
tested on-site for HBsAg using a rapid screening test.
Laboratory testing for HIV antibodies, HCV antibodies,
HBsAg, syphilis, HB, ALT, and blood types are also
performed; those blood specimens with positive testing
results will be discarded. Under those circumstances, the
donors will be informed about the positive results and in
the case of a positive HIV testing result, the case will
also be reported to the local CDC for follow-up. Some
CDCs go further to inform the donors that their testing
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use blood donation as a means of testing stigmatized
blood-borne infectious diseases such as HIV and syphilis.
In the study conducted we mentioned, the percentage is
relatively low (2.8% of donors are for a free physical
examination) [9], but caution is required.
In May 2007, the Changsha Blood Center established a
Short Message Service (SMS) system to promote vo-
luntary blood donation. Director J of the Public Services
Section explained that blood donors were very concerned
about the personal implication of the afore-mentioned
testing results. He explained:
‘This is a feedback. The blood donation cannot just
end like this. It is stated on the back of the blood
donation card that we can call the toll-free hotline to
inquire about blood information. Mobile phones are
very popular today, and we set up this platform just to
communicate physical examination information to
blood donors and enable them to know their physical
conditions’ (20080527—Director J).
Therefore, testing results have been used as an institu-
tionalized incentive, however the practice is debatable as
it may increase the number of high risk people using
blood donation as a means of testing. The potential in-
crease in the number of donors needs to be weighed
against the risk of contamination in the blood supply
due to the window period for detection of blood-borne
infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS.
The current system installs multiple measures to safe-
guard blood safety besides the laboratory tests aforemen-
tioned. First, donors need to fill out a form to declare
that they have not been diagnosed with a list of blood-
borne diseases such as leprosy and anaphylactic disease,
and that they do not belong to high risk groups (e.g.
men who have sex with men, drug users, those with
multiple sex partners and suspected HIV/STD status).
Second, their name and identification will be checked
against a database of individuals previously found to be
unsuitable for blood donation. Third, a nurse will pro-
vide counseling to remind them about the window
period property and that they should not donate blood if
they belong to the higher risk categories. Forth, they can
withdraw the blood donated if they believe some risks
exist and a contact number will be given to them. Fifth,
they are told that positive HIV results will be reported
to the local CDC and they will be contacted by the CDC
if their testing results are found to be HIV positive. Last,
they are reminded that there are centers providing free
HIV and syphilis testing and there may be penalties if
they provide false information in the form that they fill
out. Although the preventive procedures are quite com-
prehensive, we believe that this particular incentive ofinforming donors about negative testing results should
not be actively promoted. Furthermore, health education
for prospective donors is of utmost importance.
In addition to the testing-related incentive, the SMS
however, also served as an institutionalized channel for
communication between the blood center and donors.
This in turn, reinforced the act of donation by instilling
a sense of identification and social belongingness, hence
furthering positive self-appraisal. It should therefore be
maintained. Testimony is as follows:
‘However, this platform has more functions now. On
festivals and birthdays, we would send short messages
to blood donors to show our support and send our
blessings. With such respect, blood donors will surely
feel comfortable. Only in this way they will be
motivated to donate blood. In addition, when our
blood bank lacks blood, we would send messages to
them to let them know what types of blood we are
short of. They would come here whenever they are free.
For example, before this Spring Festival, we were short
of blood and sent short messages. Within 4 days, there
were over 700 donors.’ (20080527—Director J)
Some blood donors further reiterated positive associa-
tions from the act of blood donation [27]:
‘I think it is a pleasant and meaningful thing to rescue
patients who need blood urgently with my weak
force.’—Ms. H‘Beautiful angels, thank you for your hard work!
Everyone should do its best to help those who need
help.’—Ms. Z‘This is my honor because it is my purpose to help
others, just like doctors who heal the wounded and
rescue the dying. Thank you for giving me this
opportunity. I also believe that the wounded person
will recover.’—Ms. S‘Thank Changsha Blood Center very much for your
birthday blessings to me. Although I used to celebrate
birthdays on the lunar calendar other than the
Gregorian calendar, I still feel the same happiness!
Blood donation is something compulsory for me, and I
will keep doing this in the rest of my life, because this
is very meaningful. Thank you again for your
blessings’—Mr. C
We can see from these messages that blood donors
interviewed in this study in Changsha had framed
voluntary blood donation positively as an altruistic and
honorable behavior. Participation in such ‘good’ behaviors
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together with the information about one’s disease status,
may well serve as incentives institutionalized by the SMS.
The use of SMS’s further enabled interactions between the
blood center and blood donors are supported.
Identification with role models as an institutionalized
incentive
In China both at national and city levels, celebrities and
idols are used as blood donation ambassadors. These
honorary role models serve to remind the general public
that donating blood is a desirable way of contributing to
public altruism.
‘In 2007, we invited famous host WH of our provincial
TV station’s economic life channel as our province’s
image ambassador for gratuitous blood donation.
Now, he is featured in all of our brochures and posters.
In our city (Changsha), two ambassadors have been
invited. One is a host of the economic radio channel,
called ZQH, who is favored by young people and also
an Olympic torchbearer. Another one was TX, one of
the Top 10 Super Girls. These celebrities are very
popular among the youth, and are very helpful to our
publicity. They will attend the June 14th event (World
Blood Donor Day) in person.’ (20080605—Secretary Y)
Currently in China state leaders have become ‘shadow
ambassadors’ of the blood donation campaign. For in-
stance, photos of President Hu Jintao and the Minister
of Health, Chen Zhu, donating blood were placed in
some blood donation centers’ websites, with captions
like ‘Leading by Example’. By donating blood in person,
state leaders and local officials are communicating the
message that voluntary blood donation is a ‘great and
glorious’ behavior which brings public good ,and is
highly advocated, encouraged and endorsed by the state.
In China the identification with these role models
becomes an incentive as it reinforces one’s self-image of
being a solid good citizen, and creates a positive feeling
of being drawn closer to the idols by following their
steps. These interpretations would be obvious in the
following testimony.
Director W who was responsible for donor recruit-
ment at the blood center said:
‘City leaders, the municipal government and the
municipal civilization office support our work greatly.
The propaganda department of the municipal Party
committee came here last year (2007). When our
volunteer service team was founded, the head of the
propaganda department of the municipal Party
committee was present in person. These are a great
encouragement for us.’ (20080605—Director W)When summing up the blood center’s publicity expe-
rience, Director J of the Public Services Section said
emotionally:
‘I still think that the concern of the leadership is the
most important. With their concern, the gratuitous
blood donation program is at least half successful. If
the city’s leadership regards this as a political
achievement, this will be half successful. In fact, their
concern is an intangible form of leadership, because
the image of the government is irreplaceable.’
(20080527—Director J)
In the above testimony identification with such role
models through blood donation became another institu-
tionalized incentive for blood donation.
Discussion and conclusions
This paper has examined Chinese public blood donation
behaviors from an institutional perspective. The focus
has been the interactions between the public and blood
collection organizations/institutions. We should conti-
nue with the current nationwide campaigns that pub-
licize and emphasize the voluntary aspect of blood
donation because such blood collection pattern has been
proven feasible in both China and other countries. The
strong community spirit is a good basis for developing a
robust system of volunteerism in China. Secondly, the
public utility of drawing on the concept of altruism
should be integrated with the diversified motives for
blood donations found in the reported study. Further-
more, of importance is that the Chinese public has
become sensitized to blood donation as not only helpful
to others but also good for oneself and society in the
long run. Thus the institutionalization of instructional
incentives should become an explicit mechanism in the
current blood donation in China. Collectivity and the
strong administrative system in mainland of China are
very helpful to create these incentivized systems.
Further inter-disciplinary research is needed to explore
the values attached to different types of incentives and
to develop new ones, as well as ways to institutionalize
these new incentives. Examples of potential institutiona-
lized incentives include symbols of fraternity associated
with group donation in schools and social organizations
and improvement in corporate image of social responsi-
bility. Furthermore, ritual of passage for adulthood or
college graduation and memories for special anniversaries
require sustained advocacy. Another way to reinforce the
public altruistic impulse is to bring blood donors informa-
tion about the recovering recipients of local transfusions
through newsletters or film loops in blood collection point
waiting rooms and vans. Such feedback helps people
connect with the real human meaning of their gifted
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utilized to emphasize the common citizenship aspects of
blood donation, and further sustain and enhance the
current voluntary blood donation initiatives. New role
models may also be recruited from different communities
such as that of teachers, health professionals, and corpo-
rate businesses in order to generate incentives that are
more specific to the community. Of paramount impor-
tance blood collection organizations need to clarify their
current procedures for public communicating strategies
and policies in order for the public to better understand
the blood donation program. Like any other products, the
institutionalized incentives, new and old, need to be
marketed to prospective donors.
Finally, caution is required to educate donors that
those with risk behaviors related to HIV or other blood-
borne infectious diseases should not donate their blood
due to the risk of blood contamination during the
window period for detection [3,4]. Currently, preventive
measures involve counseling and laboratory screening
and other procedures. Donors have also been advised
that they can take up free HIV testing provided by the
CDC. However, such an institutionalized incentive may
increase the risk to use blood donation as a means of
testing for stigmatized blood-borne infectious diseases.
For instance, some high risk people may see it as a less
stigmatized form of HIV testing. This challenge is almost
universal as the screening for some blood borne diseases
are necessary and cannot be removed from the blood
donation process while prospective donors know about
such screening tests. The situation does not seem to be
very serious but it could get worse if the testing aspect
of blood donation is actively promoted. Although we are
unable to abolish such screening tests, health educators
should hence not promote such testing actively as an
incentive for blood donation. Other useful measures
include referrals and close collaboration between blood
donation centers and user-friendly non-governmental
organizations experienced in providing free HIV testing
to high risk individuals.
Cautions should also be made when promoting testing
in group settings, as some high-risk individuals may
donate blood due to conformity. It should be em-
phasized that donations are totally voluntary. Those who
are temporarily unfit (e.g. having a cold, lack of sleep or
mild illnesses) will not be accepted to donate blood; such
reasons should be publicized so that they can be used as
justification if needed to minimize the effect of group
conformity. It should be publicized that here is a hot-
line for immediate confidential withdrawal after blood
donation has been made in such settings. Such measures
should minimize the risk of contamination via those
settings. Overall, it is important to educate potential
donors about the concepts of window period and bloodcontamination, to provide alternatives and to instill a
strong sense of social responsibility to protect others.
Ultimately, the integrity of the donors is important.
According to Titmuss, only in the voluntary and unpaid
blood donation system, the honesty to report one’s
health condition could be guaranteed, which would most
likely increase the quality of blood and reduce the risk
of contamination [13].
We acknowledge that the results of this study may not
be generalized to the Chinese blood donation system as
a whole, given it was conducted only in one city and it
was comprised of such contextual data as opposed to
larger epidemiological work. Despite such limitations,
this study provides rich culturally informed data on
institutional blood donation incentives that contribute to
our understanding of the relationship between institu-
tional incentives and the voluntary blood donation of
contemporary Chinese citizens. This study also informs
an important knowledge gap of the new public health
campaigns that advocate for blood donation behaviors in
China. Furthermore, insights have hence been high-
lighted that add support for evaluated social marketing
exercises for specific types of institutionalized incentives
to generate evidence-based public health strategies for
promoting blood donation in China.
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